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CONTENTS, the copyright of which remains in each case with
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S.H.BRAUND(Exeter) & J.D.CLOUD(Leicester): <i>Juvenal's traducement again</i> (2.153-163)	50-51
R.J.SEAGER(Liverpool): <i>Two notes: I. Horace, Odes.1.17: II. Statius, Silvae 5.2</i>	51-53
A.S.GRATWICK(St Andrews): <i>Plautus, Casina 503</i>	53
C.J.ROWE(Bristol): <i>de Aristotelis in tribus libris Ethicorum dicendi ratione: particles, connectives and style in three books from the Aristotelian ethical treatises. PART III, continued from LCM 8.3(Mar.1983), 37-40</i>	54-57
DUANE W.ROLLER(Wilfrid Laurier, Waterloo, Ontario): <i>Some thoughts on Thales' eclipse</i>	58-59
IAN WORTHINGTON(Monash): <i>A façade charge in AthPol 16.8?</i>	59-60
R.DEVELIN(Tasmania): <i>The opening of AthPol</i>	60-61
V.W.MATTHEWS(Guelph, Ontario): <i>The meaning of εὐδαίμων at Iliad 21.279 and 23.348</i>	61-62
F.W.WALBANK(Cambridge): <i>Polybius and the aitia of the Second Punic War</i>	62-63
H.J.BLUMENTHAL(Liverpool): <i>Aristophanes, Frogs 1437-65: Palamedes</i>	64
JAMES CRESSEY(Birkbeck College, London): <i>'A nice derangement of epitaphs': Vergil, Aeneid 3.714</i>	64

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An American correspondent asked the Editor to 'Please keep on informing LCM's readers about the problems besetting classics departments in Britain. Over here in the US we tend to get a little too wrapped up in our own miseries. It helps to know that the crisis is an international one, so we should be making common cause'. Well - 'I'll tell thee everything I can, there's little to relate', and an English correspondent said that 'LCM is very discreet'. Sentiments of loyalty, and an English dislike of 'washing dirty linen in public', have led to the view, publicly expressed at CUCD, that a University prefers to deal with things on its own - a view which nicely avoids the necessity of making judgements between places and anything like the rational planning of Classics on a national basis which has long been one of the Editor's own bees. But there are signs of pressure from the University Grants Committee and a desire in University administrations to amalgamate departments as Chairs fall vacant and to favour Classics as against Latin (Humanity in Scotland) and Greek and, where this is not, as perhaps it should be, part of History, also Ancient History. Not so much from any educational policy as to save money especially on chairs (a policy supported by the Association of University Teachers) and by leaving posts unfilled (no redundancies are yet reported, though the threat is much used to make the blood run cold and, by implication, recommend policies) on the grounds that everybody can do everything in a wider department, and by relating the number of staff more closely to the number of students than to the demands of the subject. But it is good for us too in this country to be reminded that 'the crisis is an international one' and not due, as is sometimes suggested, to a deliberate Government Vendetta against Universities (though the Editor has always believed that we are in part paying for the troubles of the 60s), which might lead to the conclusion that some form of concerted response to the unpleasant necessity for change might be more effective. The fable of the bunch of sticks is always present to the Editor's mind but he is sermonizing, as may befit a Clergyman's son in Lent, but may not be to the taste of readers and subscribers.

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This is not yet another full discussion and radical re-ordering of this already much discussed passage (most recently by M.van der Valk, 'On a few points of Attic Comedy and Tragedy', in *Studi classici in onore di Q.Cataudella* II [Catania 1972], 59-66), but rather, in the original spirit of *LCM*, a kite-flying suggestion not, as far as I can find, made before, and some indications of how it might bear on the passage.

Line 1451, εὖ γ' ὦ Παλάμηδες, ὃ σοφωτάτη φύσις, is usually taken to be a comment on inventiveness or ingenuity, and therefore re-placed together with 1452-3 after 1437-41, where Euripides puts up the idea of a flying Cleocritus and bombardment with vinegar (cf. H.Dörrie, *Hermes* 84[1956], 304f.; D.M.MacDowell, *CQ* ns9[1959], 263), a rearrangement supported by the recurrence at 1453 of the ὀξεῖδες of 1440. If that is the point of 1451, then it should clearly not follow 1446-50 which are hardly a demonstration of ordinary inventiveness and ingenuity - to say nothing of the difficulties of having 1452-3 where they stand in the traditional order.

My suggestion is that Palamedes does not here stand for the ingenuity of the proposed weapon and delivery system, but rather for the special skills of sophistry, and perhaps even for the invention of these. Certainly, if innovation is implied, it could apply to rhetorical or dialectical as well as 'technical' discovery. At *Phaedrus* 261d Plato refers to an Eleatic Palamedes, who is usually identified with Zeno on the basis of the skills listed there, that is making opposites appear identical, and the apparent connexion of the opposites mentioned with Zeno's paradoxes (so already Hermias, ad loc., who like some modern commentators, e.g. Robin and de Vries, thought inventiveness is the point: ἐπειδὴ ... καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων εὐρέτης ἐγένετο). Aristotle in his *Sophist* (fr.65 = *Sophist* fr.1 Ross) attributed to Zeno the invention of dialectic. It is certainly possible, even if undemonstrable, that Plato was not the first to liken Zeno to Palamedes. The comparison of Gorgias to Nestor in the same passage could be taken for or against the view that Plato simply made up that with Palamedes, but Nestor and Gorgias seem an obvious pair, for Gorgias lived exceptionally long (cf. *DK* 82 A 1-14 passim) and had plenty to say.

If Palamedes was a current soubriquet for Zeno in the 5th century the name's other connotations would be secondary or even immaterial, and the Palamedes of *Frogs* 1451 would indicate sophistry, in line with the imprecise but comically convenient way in which Aristophanes lumped together sophists and philosophers. The imprecision would be lessened if one were to accept F.Solmsen's picture of Zeno himself as a sort of sophist and experimenter rather than a committed follower of Parmenides (*Phronesis* 16[1971] 140f.; cf. also J.Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers* [London 1979] I. 294f.; contra G.Vlastos, *JHS* 95[1975], esp. 150-61, who incidentally cites *Frogs* 1451 as evidence that 'Palamedes' does not imply dishonesty [*ibid.* 154f.] without connecting the line with Zeno).

Sophistic argument, or rather Aristophanes' presentation of it, would be an appropriate description of the advice in 1443-50, with its list of conversions to opposite views and practices, not altogether unlike the ἀντιλογική attributed to Zeno in the *Phaedrus*, 261d-e. Moreover 1463-5 are couched in similar sophistic language, and would appropriately come soon after 1451. A.H.Sommerstein has pointed out that the reiteration of πιστ- words in 1443-7 is characteristic of the portrayal of Euripides in this play, with his devotion to Πεισῶ (CQ ns24[1974], 27). But in several of the texts adduced by Sommerstein Euripides is, as often, presented as a sophist. Thus at 892 γλώσσης στροφίγῃ comes with a lot of other phoney intellectual baggage of the kind attributed to Socrates the arch-sophist in the *Clouds* (cf. with αἰθέρ ἐμὸν βόσκημα 892 αἰθέρα ... βιοδρέμματα *Clouds* 570: at *Clouds* 424 Socrates' gods are χάος, νεφέλαι and γλώττα). *Frogs* 971-9, with references to σκέψις and λογισμός fall into the same category (cf. again *Clouds*, with the frequent invitation σκέψαι). If Euripides is being presented in his sophist guise in the earlier part of our passage too, the association with a recognizably 'sophistic' philosopher would be much to the point. As often, if the identification is not made by all, not much is lost.

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JAMES CRESSEY(Birkbeck College, London): 'A nice derangement of epitaphs': *Vergil, Aeneid* 3.714

LCM 8.4(Apr.1983), 64

hic labor extremus, longarum haec meta uiarum.

hinc me digressum uestris deus appulit oris. A.3.714-715

'Aeneas calls the death of Anchises his 'last agony', losing in his sense of it all recollection of the subsequent shipwreck ...' Conington ad loc.. 'Drepanum was not in fact the end of his voyage or his suffering, but he pays Dido the compliment of saying that now he has safely reached the friendly city of Carthage he feels his trials are over.' R.D.Williams (Oxford 1962) ad loc..

But line 714 does not refer to Aeneas. For the sepulchral use of *hic* cf. Tibullus 1.3.55 *hic iacet immitti consumptus morte Tibullus*. Livy 26.25.14 *adicerentque humatis titulum, hic siti Acarnanes*. CIL 1,2.11; 1211, the tralatitious *heic est sepulcrum hau pulcrum pulcrat feminae*; 1295; 1312; 1734; 1861; & passim. For *hic* linked with *meta*, Vergil, A.12.546 *hic tibi mortis erant metae*. For *meta*, A.10.471-2 *sua Turnum | fata uocant, metasque dati peruenit at aevi* and other similar uses in L.S & OLD s.v.. For *hic* with *labor*, CIL 1,2.1325 *heic situs sum Lemiso | quem nunquam nisi mors | finiuit labore*. *uia* refers to Anchises' travels and travails - the metaphorical association of the word with *uita* is frequent in Latin: for life as a journey/race cf. Dido's epitaph on herself, A.4. 653 *uixi, et, quem dederat cursum fortuna, peregi* (see E.Fraenkel, *Glotta* 33[1954], 157ff.), and Dante, *Purgatorio* 20.39 *quella vita ch'al termine vola*, 33.54 *viver ch'è un correre alla morte*.

Line 714 then is Anchises' epicede.

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- Curius quid sentit et ambo
- 155 *Scipiadae, quid Fabricius manesque Camilli,
quid Cremerae legio et Cannis consumpta iuventus,
tot bellorum animae, quotiens hinc talis ad illos
umbra uenit? cuperent lustrari, si qua darentur
sulpura cum taedis et si foret umida laurus.*
- 160 *illic heu miseri traducimur. arma quidem ultra a
litora Iuerna promouimus et modo captas
Orcadas ac minima contentos nocte Britannos,
sed quae nunc populi fiunt uictoris in urbe
non faciunt illi quos uicimus.* Juvenal 2.153-163
- 156 *talis* sc. like the effeminate Gracchus

In LCM 8.1(Jan.1983), 14-16 Yvan Nadeau challenges the triumphal overtones of *traducimur* at Juvenal, *Sat.* 2.159, and instead proposes that the image is taken from the *equitum census*

I. Nadeau's suggestion is not new; as Niall Rudd pointed out (LCM 8.2[Feb.1983], it was made by Friedländer in his 1895 commentary on Juvenal, where he glosses the word, ad loc. thus: *dort (vor den Geistern der Ahnen) ziehen wir (wie die Ritter vor dem Censor) vorbei (und offenbaren ihnen unsere Schande)*. It is, however, worth noticing that Friedländer was not consistent in his interpretation, for at 8.17 he comments on *traducit*: *giebt dem Spotte preis, wie 2.159; 11.31* (our underlining).

Of course we can agree with N. that censorship is an important theme in the poem, and that Juvenal makes skilful use of the techniques of multiple allusion. But it is highly questionable whether he is alluding to the *equitum census* here, for the following reasons.

Firstly, dictionaries cite the verb only in the phrase *traducere equum* for the context of the *equitum census*. But Friedländer's paraphrase and N.'s interpretation require that *traducimur* = *traducimus equos*. We know of no examples with such a context, nor does N. produce any; since *traducere equum* is *prima facie* a technical phrase, the *onus probandi* lies with N. to show that *traducimur* can ever mean *traducimus equos*. As it is, the only meaning the verb would seem to have, if we were to push the census image, is 'we horses are being led past (the censors) - the Houyhnhnms parading before the Yahoos!'

But even supposing that *traducimur* could mean *traducimus equos*, the verb as a metaphor from the *equitum census* presents another grave difficulty. It is virtually certain that the censors only ordered the *equos traducere equum* if they had no fault to find with either his character or the equipment of his horse; if they were dissatisfied with the knight, he was not permitted to pass on but ordered to sell his horse. If this were not the sequence of events, one can scarcely make sense of the story told of the younger Scipio's censorship by Cicero (*Cluent.* 134) and Valerius Maximus (4.1.10). When C.Licinius Sacerdos came forward, Scipio declared in a loud voice, so that the whole *contio* could hear, that he knew that Sacerdos had committed solmen and deliberate perjury - *illum uerbis conceptis peierasse* (Cicero) - and that if anyone present wished to accuse Sacerdos, that man should use his (Scipio's) evidence. But no-one was prepared to act as accuser and Scipio ordered Sacerdos to pass one - *iussit equum traducere* (Cicero). The point is perhaps even clearer in Valerius Maximus' version, where Scipio addresses Sacerdos with the words *transduc equum et lucri fac censoriam notam* (= think yourself lucky you did not receive the censor's *nota*), *ne ego in tua persona et accusatoris et testis et iudicis partes egisse uidear*. Since at the corresponding point in the ceremony where the censor wishes to penalize the person before him Livy (39.37.5) uses the phrase *equum uendere iussit*, the implication is that if anyone else had spoken against Sacerdos, he would have received the *nota censoria* and not have been allowed to lead his horse past the censor. It is probably also the point of Ovid *Trist.* 2.89-90 that the very fact of being allowed to pass the censor with one's horse was deemed to constitute his approval of the *equos*. But the cash value of the image in our Juvenal passage cannot possibly be 'we pass muster', 'we satisfy the censors' moral and material criteria'; for this is something to be proud of and pleased with, and both *heu* and *miseri* make it plain that *traducimur* means something unpleasant. Indeed, degradation rather than the official seal of moral approval would be more apt to the context.

Nor does Nadeau's appeal to *lustrari* (157) to support the census-allusion help his case: Juvenal never uses this verb to refer to the censor's lustration, cf. 6.518 and 13.63. Nor, contra N., can *Aeneid* 6 be used to 'guarantee' the census-allusion, though we would not wish to deny the overall allusion to Aeneas' *word-bearing* in this final section of *Satire* 2. The censorial overtones of *Aeneid* 6.679-683, perceived by Austin and N., are by no means impossible but seem faint: *lustrabat* 681 is rightly subsumed under OLD 5, 'to survey', and *recensebat* 682 under OLD 1, 'to count', thus providing no explicit connexion with the censor. Nor do lines 886-7 of *Aeneid* 6 [for which the Editor unfortunately omitted the reference at LCM 8.1(Jan.1983), 16] lend any support, for not only are they at some distance from 679-683, but also the plural verb *lustrant* (again = 'survey') has as its subject both Anchises and Aeneas, and can hardly be taken as an allusion to Anchises' *lustrum* - unless we take Aeneas too to be conducting a *lustrum*. Can we really suppose that Juvenal expects his audience to perceive parody of the 'census' of *Aeneid* 6 when that 'census' is only faintly evoked by two words in the text of Virgil? Likewise, Juvenal's *lustrari* would be a poor indication of parody, since Juvenal uses the verb elsewhere without specific reference to the censor's activities. The supposedly 'elaborate' reference to a lustration in lines 157-8 is better explained as an absurd picture of shades purifying them-

selves, absurd because of the corporeal/incorporeal discrepancy - an absurdity which is emphasized by the vivid details.

II. The word *traducimur* here literally means 'we are exposed to scorn' (OLD 4b). And of course it is true that there is no explicit reference to a triumph in the surrounding context, though *laurus* is the last word in the preceding line, denoting, according to Courtney, Ferguson and Friedländer, a form of aspergillum, but inevitably provoking the more familiar associations of laurel with the triumph - indeed H.S. Versnel, *Triumphus* (1970), 56, calls laurel the 'symbol of the triumph'. But with or without the associations of *laurus*, the verb *traducimur* strongly evokes the context in which it often occurs, frequently in the passive (OLD 3); in fact, it is plausible to suppose that the meaning 'to expose to scorn' (categorized as OLD 4b) is a metaphor deriving from the specific and literal use of the word in the context of a triumph, a metaphor first attested in Livy (see both Duff and Courtney on Juvenal *Satire* 8.17). The close of *Satire* 2 has a marked military flavour in general (see W.S. Anderson's analysis of the *Satire*, now conveniently available in *Essays on Roman Satire* [1982], 209-219). In particular, Juvenal introduces a deliberate play on the conqueror and the conquered only three lines later (162-163): these factors would seem to support the triumphal overtones of *traducimur*; cf. Courtney ad loc.: 'the Romans are led like captives in a triumph, though seemingly victorious (162)'.

For this evocation of the triumph by the verb *traducere*, we may compare *Sat.* 8.17, where the effeminate Fabius *squalentis traducit auos*. This is part of a passage (1-20) which has many features in common with the close of *Satire* 2: in both passages Juvenal draws a contrast between the military prowess of past generations and the decadence of modern Romans; both passages feature a quasi-catalogue of military valour in the lines preceding the verb *traducere*; both focus upon an effeminate as the agent of exposure; and both passages are heavily laden with military imagery and language, which provides the major standard against which to judge the effeminate/homosexuals (*Satire* 2) and decadent nobles (*Satire* 8).

The triumphal overtones of 8.17 seem to be clinched by the reference to triumphal statues at line 3, *stantis in curribus Aemilianos*: Juvenal represents the decline of the great Roman families through the ironic evocation of triumphal ceremonies, just as the costume and accoutrements of the *triumphator* are the ironic paradigm of the pretentious and the ridiculous in contemporary Roman ceremonial in *Satire* 10.36-46. Ironic in *Satire* 8 because it is there the ancestors themselves who are exposed to ridicule (hence line 17). Similarly, given the prominent military flavour of the close of *Satire* 2, it is hard to perceive any but triumphal overtones in the verb *traducimur*, 'we are exposed to ridicule'. If anyone can think of a better explanation, we would be delighted to accept it.

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R.J. SEAGER (Liverpool): *Two notes: I. Horace, Odes 1.17: II. Statius, Silvae 5.2*

LCM 8.4 (Apr. 1983), 51-53

I. Horace, *Odes* 1.17. It has been denied that this ode is a kletikon (R.G.M. Nisbet - M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace Odes Book I* [1970], 216). The view has also been put forward that the second half of the poem (from 14) is a kletikon, while the first half is not (E. Fraenkel, *Horace* [1957], 204; H.P. Syndikus, *Die Lyrik des Horaz I* [1972], 192, though cf. 188). It is the purpose of this note to argue that the crucial pivotal sentence *di me tuentur, dis pietas mea | et musa cordi est* (13f.) has been misinterpreted, and that a proper understanding of its function confirms that *Odes* 1.17 is indeed a kletikon, but of a highly unusual kind.

The customary interpretation of 13f. is as a summary and explanation of the three preceding stanzas; in other words, it is the charm and plenty of his rural retreat, as detailed in these stanzas, which Horace is attributing to the protection of the gods (thus, e.g., A. Kiessling - R. Heinze [1955], ad loc.; F. Klingner, *Römische Geisteswelt* [1956], 397 & 400; Fraenkel, 207; Syndikus, 192). But elsewhere in Latin poetry exclamations of this kind, affirming belief in the existence and/or favour of the gods, signalize rather the granting by the gods of some single, specific, immediate and perhaps unexpected boon. Thus Statius, *Silvae* 1.4.1-6:

*estis, io, superi, nec inexorabile Clotho
uoluit opus! uidet alma pios Astraea Iouique
conciliata redit! dubitataque sidera cernit
Gallicus. es caelo, diue, es, Germanice, cordi*
5 *(quis neget?): erubuit tanto spoliare ministro
imperium Fortuna tuum*

The parallels here are close: the reward for piety (2) and the use of *cordi* (4), though encomiastically transferred from the poet himself to Domitian. What has been vouchsafed by the gods is one precise blessing, the recovery of Gallicus from his illness, which had been in doubt (3). The situation is similar in Tibullus 1.5. Here the poet prays that retribution will descend on the bawd who has led Delia astray (49-56), then exclaims (57f.):

*eueniet; dat signa deus: sunt numina amanti,
saeuit et iniusta lege relicta Venus.*

Once again the expression of belief in the gods and their favour is inspired by the satisfactory resolution of a specific question, the answer to which had hitherto been in doubt: namely, whether or not the poet's prayer would be answered. Perhaps most relevant is Propertius 1.8. There, after his triumphant announcement that his protestations have been effective, and that Cynthia is not going abroad after all, Propertius proclaims (41f.):

*sunt igitur Musae, neque amanti tardus Apollo,
quis ego fretus amo: Cynthia rara mea est!*

In each instance the affirmation of belief in divine favour is a response by the poet to a single event which constitutes a key point in the scenario of the poem: Gallicus' recovery, the sign vouchsafed to Tibullus, and Cynthia's change of mind.

Random examples drawn from further afield confirm the pattern. Thus Laertes at the end of the *Odyssey* (24.351f.):

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἢ ῥα ἐτ' ἔστέ θεοὶ κατὰ μακρὸν Ὀλύμπῳ,
εἰ ἔτεόν μνηστῆρες ἀπάσθalon ὕβριν ἔτισαν.

On learning the news of Theseus' victory over Creon, the Chorus in Euripides' *Suppliants* exclaims (731ff.):

νῦν τήνδ' ἀελπίων ἡμέραν ἰδοῖσ' ἐγὼ
θεοὺς νομίζω, καὶ δοκῶ τῆς συμφορᾶς
ἔχειν ἔλασσον, τῶνδε τεισάντων δόλην.

That Ap. Claudius should have been driven to appeal to *provocatio* produced a similar reaction in bystanders (Livy 3.56.7): *et dum pro se quisque deos tandem esse et non negligere humana fremunt et superbiae crudelitatis etsi seras, non leues tamen uenire poenas etc.*

It has been convincingly demonstrated that Propertius 1.8 is a unified whole (cf. F. Cairns, *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* [1972], 148ff.). I would suggest that *Odes* 1.17 is constructed on the same principle. An invitation, which she may or may not accept, is issued to Tyndaris in 1-12, the exclamation *di ... cordi est* in 13f. serves as a signal that the invitation has in fact been accepted, and 14-28 confirm this by rehearsing the motifs of the first three stanzas in more personal forms that are directly related to the pleasures that Tyndaris will enjoy thanks to her acceptance. This explanation not only gives a point to the repetition of motifs between the two halves of the poem which is lacking on other interpretations, but also illuminates more than any other the contrast between them.

The first three stanzas are impersonal; only the vocative *Tyndari* (10) overtly points to the genre. However, the characteristics attributed to Horace's estate are not irrelevant to the purpose which is revealed more specifically in the second part of the ode. Faunus protects the herds from extremes of climate (3-5); so the weather will also be suitable for picnics. Goats may wander in quest of fun or fodder untroubled by the fear of snakes and wolves (5-9); so too may poets and their girls. The acoustics are good (10-13); a condign spot, then, for Tyndaris to exercise her skills (on the correspondences, cf. Fraenkel, 205; Syndikus, 195). The motifs employed are also to be found in other Horatian kletika (weather: 2.11.13f., 3.29.16ff., 4.12.1ff.; Faunus: 4.12.11f.; scenery: 2.11.13f.; music: 2.11.22, 3.28.9ff., 4.11.34f. & 12.9f.). Thus the kletic nature of these stanzas is clear, though discreetly expressed.

Then comes the offer of thanks to the gods. By comparison with the parallels cited Horace is ruthlessly elliptical. He does not explain directly, as the elegists and Statius do, the reason for his outcry, that is, that Tyndaris has accepted his invitation, but leaves it to the reader to deduce that, if a formula habitually used to signal gratitude and relief that a matter, the result of which was uncertain, has in fact fallen out well, is uttered immediately after the issue of an invitation, that can only indicate in context that the invitation has been received with favour. The reader may of course require corroboration; he will find it in what follows. Where the first three stanzas expounded the virtues of Horace's farm in general and impersonal terms, the last four restate them in a manner designed to show how Tyndaris herself will benefit. She will be able to enjoy the fresh air, eat, drink, sing and love, safe from the elegiac temper of her urban lover. By making her acceptance an integral and dynamic element in the structure of the poem, Horace has produced one of his most striking and refined performances.

(I am grateful for much discussion of the poem and my views, which he should not be assumed to accept, to Ian DuQuesnay).

II. Statius, *Silvae* 5.2. It should hardly be necessary to insist that a poem which begins *rura meus Tyrrhena petit ... Crispinus* and ends *uade alacer maioraque disce mereri* is a propempticon. Nevertheless scholars seem to have been bemused by its ancient title *laudes Crispini*. Thus F. Vollmer, *P. Papini Stati Silvarum Libri* (1898), 511: *hält das Gedicht die Mitte zwischen προπempticon und laudatio*; S. T. Newmyer, *The Silvae of Statius* (1979), 42: the poem, 'primarily representative of one genre, the panegyric, includes thematic elements from others'. That any propempticon should contain a large measure of panegyric is of course to be expected (cf. Menander 395.4ff., 397.16ff.). The alternation between directly propemptic and encomiastic elements is the principal structural device employed in the present example, though to posit any crude dichotomy between the two would do great injustice to the subtlety with which Statius handles his material.

Lines 1-4 are clearly propemptic (on the contents of the propempticon, cf. the works cited by DuQuesnay, in Cairns [ed.], *Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar Third Volume* [1981], 155 n. 295). Crispinus is going on a journey (1), which does not involve the customary dangers (2). But Statius' concern for his wellbeing is so great that he is just as worried as if Crispinus were setting out to face the notorious perils of the sea (3-7). That imagined journey, it is at once revealed (8-10), would be to win glory in war. Therefore the poet and Crispinus' other friends and relations must rejoice, despite their sorrow at parting, both because of the glory inherent in such a mission and because of the proof of his virtue given by Crispinus' eagerness to depart (8-14). These lines form an elegantly flattering alternative to schetliasmos: instead of first reproaching Crispinus for his determination, then acquiescing, Statius insists that his friends must from the first contain their feelings and approve his purpose because of its honourable motive and predictably glorious outcome.

This opening section also illustrates three other important aspects of the poem. First, the theme of the double journey: the holiday in Etruria, which is not mentioned again (pace Newmyer, 120), and the military mission, which gains in substance as the poem progresses. Second, and related to this, the theme of prophecy, neatly hinted at at the very outset by the reference to Tages (1). Third, the complexity of Statius' relationship with Crispinus. Statius calls him friend (5) and stresses his affection for him (*meus* in 1 and the expressions of concern in 3-7 and 10f.).

But he also treats him with respect (*puer inlute* in 8) and clearly regards him as a social superior, which outweighs the difference in their ages, though this does justify a little proreptic advice.

53

The next section (15-60), beautifully linked to what precedes by *nec mirum*, is devoted to encomium. Statius praises Crispinus' ancestors in general (15-30) before focussing on his father (30-60), whom the boy is urged to imitate (30ff., 51-60). Bolanus' achievements, being principally military, are particularly relevant to Crispinus' imminent journey to the wars, the real occasion of the poem. Again Statius addresses Crispinus with respect (27: *clare puer*).

The third section begins at 61, but so skilfully are the propemptic and encomiastic elements blended that it would be both difficult and misguided to say dogmatically where it ends and the second instalment of panegyric begins, though 70 may be chosen for the sake of convenience. There is a textual problem in 61, though *alio* is accepted by most editors, and the most recent, Marastoni, thinks no conjecture worth recording. It could mean either 'somewhere your father did not go', but that is excluded by 140ff., or 'somewhere other than Etruria', which is both feeble and difficult, since that journey has already been virtually forgotten (cf. Vollmer ad loc.). Either *adeo* (Markland) or *animo* (Waller) would be better. It is fortunately clear that only the military journey is in point, since Crispinus' youth and orphaned state could hardly be seen as objections to spending a weekend in the country. The references to his youth and lack of a father (62ff.) might seem like elements of schetliasmos, but as before schetliasmos is repudiated, this time by the whole of the protracted encomium which is introduced by *at* in 71 and continues to 124. Thus propemptic and panegyric are inseparably welded together in their relevance to one another.

The panegyric itself proceeds from where it left off. Crispinus' ancestry has been dealt with, so now the poet catalogues the proofs of his precocious virtue in various fields both moral and practical, seizing the opportunity to ascribe to Crispinus not merely social but also moral superiority to himself (81ff.). The final prophetic vision of Crispinus as youthful warrior (117-124) elegantly prepares for the return of the theme of his departure on his military mission.

From 125 to the end the propemptic predominates. To the already established motif of Crispinus' own noble eagerness to go is added at 125 the assurance, as yet still prophetic, that Domitian will provide the necessary commission. There is no longer any hint of schetliasmos: the doubts about Crispinus' age, inexperience and lack of protection which were mooted only to be dismissed at 62ff. are now strikingly replaced by an expression of complete confidence in the basic training he will receive from various gods (128ff.). Speculation about his destination makes possible further praise of Bolanus (140-151). Then the theme of envy of the fortunate friend who will be Crispinus' *comes* (152-8) leads gracefully to a further parade of Statius' own affection, this time in the exculatory form most appropriate to a military propempticon (158-163). Next comes the required prediction of Crispinus' safe and glorious return (164-7), before Statius' prophecy is triumphantly fulfilled by the arrival of Domitian's messenger (168-174). The final injunction to go is of course entirely free from *arrière-pensées*, hardly surprisingly, since schetliasmos would now be not merely tactless but tantamount to treason and blasphemy.

Statius has been justly praised for his handling of the gradual progress of Crispinus' military mission from mere potentiality in his own imagination to the immediate reality of Domitian's summons. But clarity does not seem to have been achieved about the practical relationship (whether real or fictional) between this journey and Crispinus' Etruscan holiday. That holiday is mentioned only in 1-7, at which point Crispinus is just about to set off for the country, and no change of place or time is indicated throughout the rest of the poem. That is, we have to think of the emperor's emissary arriving in time to forestall Crispinus' departure for Etruria and change his destination to that more glorious one for which he has already been yearning, just as Statius' poem is diverted from its modest beginnings, first by prophetic imaginings, then by their fulfilment, to a more elevated and noble end. But to enquire whether in fact Crispinus managed to get his holiday before going off to the wars (or indeed whether he was ever about to go on holiday at all) would, I suspect, to worry too much about the relationship between generic composition and life.

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A.S.GRATWICK(St Andrews): *Plautus*, *Casina* 503

LCM 8.4(Apr.1983), 53

... OL. *iamme abeo?* LY. *uolo*

So the Mss. and editors. *uolo* would be a reasonably effective reply if Olympio had asked *uin abeam*, but is weak as Lysidamus' exit-word. Having won the lottery, both speakers are in an exuberant mood. The one is to go to the market and *opsonari ampliter*, no expense spared (501); the other is in a hurry to see his friend Alcesimus to tell him that plan X, the evacuation of his household, is operative at last. Without even bothering to knock, Lysidamus bustles into his neighbour's house, and the innocent-looking disyllable at the end of 503 is his parting remark. Dramatic gusto requires something stronger than *uolo*, something that would allow Lysidamus an extravagant gesture as he departs. We provide him with the appropriate flourish if we read

... OL. *iamme abeo?* LY. *uola!*

The conjecture is corroborated by *Per.199 face rem hanc cum cura geras: uola curriculo*, *Mer.486 uisne eam ad portum?* CH. *qui potius quam uoles?* ('Why ire rather than uolare?'), Terence, *Hec.438 uola!* as line-end, 'Off with you!'

I thought this was my idea, but it is in fact Dousa the Elder's; *ualeant qui nostra ante nos ...* It is not mentioned in the standard modern editions, but is obviously right.

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- 54 C.J. ROWE (Bristol): *de Aristotelis in tribus locis Ethicorum dicendi ratione: particles, connectives and style in three books from the Aristotelian ethical treatises. PART III, continued from LCM 8.3 (Mar. 1983), 37-40.* LCM 8.4 (Apr. 1983), 54-57

The method that I now suggest is that, as well as counting occurrences of items, or of particular uses of items, as proportions of the total number of words in a given context or group of contexts, we should also count them against occurrences of other items with the same meaning or function; where an item or a use of it forms an enabling part of a particular syntactical structure, the occurrences of that structure should be counted against occurrences of alternative structures. This is the sort of approach which Kenny implicitly uses in other parts of his books (e.g. when dealing with prepositions and adverbs), and it is an obviously important part of any study of word-usage which is intended as a measurement of style. Word-usage is affected by a large number of different factors, the most central of which will clearly be the demands of the context: the subject-matter being dealt with, the approach adopted by the author, the nature of his audience, and so on. Another likely factor, and the one that interests me particularly here, is the preferences that the author may have for particular means of expression over others which are equivalent to them; and I propose to treat the sum total of such preferences in any given context as an aspect of the style of that context. If we measure these preferences, we will naturally allow in differences, e.g. of approach and audience, which might generally be regarded as affecting style. On the other hand, we should largely be able to exclude the influence of subject-matter; if any group of items are really equivalent to one another, any effect which subject-matter has will presumably be on the total incidence of items from the group taken together, rather than on the selection of one item from it in preference to another.

It happens that this approach is especially appropriate with respect to particles and connectives, because a large number of them are either interchangeable or at least overlapping in use. The question is, then, whether the preferences among particular groups of items shown by AE are more similar to those shown by NE or to those shown by EE. This is not to say that simple counting may not itself sometimes reveal differences which should be listed under the heading of style: so it may do, perhaps, in the case of connective καί, considered above⁶⁷. But where an item forms part of a group of similar items, we cannot be sure, until we know the count for the group as a whole, whether a higher or lower count for the given item in any context being tested really reflects a relevant difference; Aristotle might have the same degree of liking or dislike for it as in other rival contexts, but simply more or less opportunity for deploying it. We need not, of course, be concerned with the question whether the preferences at issue are deliberate and conscious, or rather unconscious, although the amount of conscious attention which Aristotle normally devoted to the style of the treatises, however admirably functional it may be, was presumably limited. Kenny suggests to me the analogy of an individual's signature, which can be produced or reproduced either with meticulous attention or with none at all, but is still the individual's mark, and which can also change, again either as a result of deliberate policy, or without the change necessarily even being noticed. In terms of this analogy, what we will be studying is variations in Aristotle's forming of parts of his signature in NE IV, AE A and EE III.

In accordance with the method proposed, I shall now go back over a large number of Kenny's items, grouping them together as appropriate, and adding to each group any relevant items which were not included in his list because they generally occurred in numbers too small for the application of the statistical tests. This will give us a more complete picture of Aristotle's behaviour in particular areas (that is, in the sample books); it will also uncover one or two additional features of that behaviour which are either of measurable importance in the sample books, or might be of measurable importance outside them. First, I consider some groups of individual particles and connectives which are either mutually interchangeable or at least overlapping in meaning and/or function; in the second place, I consider two groups of what we may roughly call 'patterns of argument', which are for the most part articulated by different particles and connectives. The special cases of γάρ, ἐπεὶ and ὥστε, which have already been marked out as significant⁶⁸, will reappear as we proceed, in a way that should make the precise nature of their significance rather clearer. By no means all the results will be positive or striking; indeed one general result will be to indicate the very high degree of uniformity of Aristotle's style. But this is by itself a not uninteresting conclusion⁶⁹; it may also be useful to be able to isolate what may be some of the standard features of Aristotle's writing. At the same time, we shall as before be able to suggest lines of investigation which might give positive results in other contexts or larger samples.

I. Interchangeable / overlapping particles and connectives

- a. ἀρα, ὅτι, διό, διόπερ, οὖν, τοίνυν, ὥστε (connective)

TABLE I (on next page)

67. See LCM 8.3 (Mar. 1983), 39.

68. See LCM 8.3 (Mar. 1983), 40.

69. I suspect that it would accord with the intuition of most readers of the treatises; though perhaps what mostly strikes us is rather how uniformly unmistakeable Aristotle is for any one else.

TABLE I

	NE IV	AE A	EE III	55
ἀρα	1	19	0	
δῆ (i.e. as equivalent to, or weaker version of ἀρα οὖν etc. ⁷⁰)	14	5	4	
διό	11	15	14	
διόπερ	2	0	1	
οὖν ⁷⁰	24	20	8	
τοίνυν	0	3	0	
ὥστε (connective)	2	22	10	
	54	84	37	

(It would be silly to suggest that all the items in this table are precisely equivalent. The inclusion of διό/διόπερ, in particular, may look odd. The words may have two rather different senses: not only 'hence', drawing a conclusion, but also 'this is why ...', adding a corroboration or illustration. On the other hand I find it impossible to distribute the actual occurrences of the word on this principle, perhaps because the two senses really shade into each other: in 'A (one state of affairs) / this is why B (another state of affairs)', B may be simultaneously offered as corroboration of A, and explained by reference to A; and the first sense, if distinguishable at all from the second, will include some pretty weak cases of inference. So far as I can tell, however, in the large majority of cases of διό/διόπερ in the sample books (though not in all: see e.g. NE IV 1124b15) some kind of inference is being made from what precedes to what follows; if so, their inclusion in the table is justified⁷¹).

As the table shows, the degree of dislike for ὥστε shown by NE IV is almost matched by the degree of favour which AE A, in contrast with both the other books, bestows on ἀρα. If, then, we may assume that by and large all items in the table are comparable, we should say that there is one item which isolates NE IV over against AE A and EE III, and one which isolates AE A over against NE IV and EE III (the figures for δῆ are regular by the usual test; but see below). We may, however, plausibly account for the high incidence of ἀρα in AE A as resulting from a desire for variation (so too its occasional use of τοίνυν); certainly, uses of ἀρα are interspersed with uses of οὖν, ὥστε, and the rest. The hypothesis receives further support from the fact that ἀρα, by Kenny's count, appears only 6 times altogether in the other AE books; a high incidence of ἀρα is not therefore typical of AE as a whole⁷², but perhaps serves just as a further indication of the degree of argumentativeness of the book, on which we have remarked before⁷³. We are left, then, with the case of ὥστε. Even when we allow for the greater incidence of items from the group as a whole in AE A, it is still true that when either AE A or EE III wish to say 'A / therefore (hence) B', they are significantly more likely than NE IV to do so by using connective ὥστε.

According to the study by R.Eucken, *De Aristotelis decendi ratione* (Göttingen 1866), from which the title of the present paper is adapted, and to which Kenny refers as probably the only predecessor to his own study in chapter 4 of his book, ὥστε in NE generally is replaced by δῆ. The evidence of NE IV is consistent with, but is not sufficient to confirm that hypothesis. On the other hand, it follows from what has already been said that we might in principle expect stylistic differences to travel in pairs or groups. That is, in this particular case, given roughly the same frequency of the pattern 'A / therefore B', the lower frequency of use in any given context of one particle as a means of expressing this pattern should be balanced by a correspondingly higher rate of occurrence of a different particle or particles from the same group similarly employed. Whether such a relationship holds between ὥστε and δῆ in NE still remains finally to be established; but it will clearly be a fruitful subject for investigation⁷⁴.

70. In reading the figures for δῆ and οὖν, we should keep in mind the qualifications attached to them earlier (*LCM* 8.1 [Jan.1983], 9-10 [6. δῆ] & 11 ['δῆ presents what may be special problems'] with n.42 [οὖν]).

71. This is probably one example, and there are many, where language is too subtle to submit easily to classification: classification draws lines, while language shades.

72. Kenny's results make AE show a relatively high degree of uniformity in particle usage; ἀρα will then constitute a further exception. But in any case I question the grounds of his comparison, which is of course based on raw counts.

73. See *LCM* 8.3 (Mar.1983), 38.

74. A different kind of 'hence' is expressed by ὅθεν at NE IV 1126a19 (ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα). ὅθεν is, incidentally, another interesting example of the way in which simple counting can mislead. Kenny gives figures of 34, 1 and 7 for NE, AE and EE respectively, which makes it look as though ὅθεν is a favourite of NE by contrast with AE and EE. But 13 out of the 34 occurrences in NE are in IV, and 12 out of these 13 are in two very specific contexts, the discussions of liberality and φιλοτιμία, which are concerned with the sources respectively of one's means and one's τιμή. EE III also discusses liberality, so that the absence of ὅθεν there (there are no examples of ὅθεν at all in EE III) is striking; but we would not expect any comparable use of ὅθεν in AE A. If so, a fair proportion of the cases in NE IV are known to be determined by subject-matter (in some sense: for an analogous situation, see *LCM* 8.3 [Mar.1983], 38-39 [ὡς in the treatment of μεγαλοψυχία]); and the example of NE IV suggests that we had better investigate the remaining cases.

56 b. ἐπεὶ (= 'since', 'if'), (ἐπειδὴ), ὅτι (= 'because'), (διότι).

TABLE II

	NE IV	AE A	EE III
ἐπεὶ	1	10	11
(ἐπειδὴ	0	0	1) ⁷⁵
ὅτι	4	15	8
(διότι	0	1	1) ⁷⁵

In principle, ἐπεὶ and ὅτι are here close in meaning; they do not, however, appear as strictly interchangeable in the sample books, in which ἐπεὶ tends to be used where the causal clause precedes the main clause of the sentence, ὅτι where it follows the main clause (precise figures are given under 2.a. below). But they are still related to each other, to the extent that they each form part of a wider collection of means of expressing what we may loosely call causal relationships (which will also include e.g. genitive absolutes, διὰ τὸ + infinitive): see 2.a.. On the basis of the present figures, we can say only that NE IV has fewer causal clauses beginning with conjunctions than either AE A or EE III; and that its isolation is particularly marked with respect to the use of ἐπεὶ. But see also 1.d. below.

c. καθάπερ, οἷον, ὥς, ὥστε.

The relationship between these words is complex: καθάπερ, οἷον and ὥστε can all be used to introduce examples (though in the sample books καθάπερ happens not to be used like this); καθάπερ, ὥς occasionally) and ὥστε can all be used to introduce backward (or forward) references, or references to external authorities; ὥς and ὥστε are also interchangeable in other uses; οἷον and ὥστε (and ὥς) overlap in the meaning 'as it were', 'as if'; while both οἷον and ὥς have uses which are not shared by καθάπερ or ὥστε.

i. Introducing examples.

TABLE III

	NE IV	AE A	EE III
(καθάπερ	0	0	0)
οἷον	13	25	18
ὥστε	2	3	3

These are not the only ways in which Aristotle introduces examples: NE IV 1124b15, for instance, uses διό (in its role as introducing corroboration / illustration); but they are by far the most typical of the sample books. No significant differences appear here, except that clearly οἷον is more favoured in all three books than ὥστε.

ii. Introducing forward / backward references, references to other authorities.

TABLE IV

	NE IV	AE A	EE III
καθάπερ	2	1	2
ὥς	0	1	1
ὥστε	8	5	7

Here too Aristotle has other means at his disposal for achieving the same end: e.g. he may refer back by simply saying εἰρηται ὅτι; or again, compare EE III 1231a11 διὸ ἐμμελὲς ἔφη Στρατόνικος. The list is merely of the alternative words available to (i.e. used by) Aristotle if he wants to say 'as I said / will say / so-and-so says' (I separate ii from i just because the range of alternatives is different in the two cases: I suppose that ὥς could conceivably be used in context i, but οἷον is obviously less well adapted to context ii than to context i. Both contexts in fact involve roughly the same area of meaning / use, in so far as examples tend themselves to be corroborative; though see e.g. EE III 1232a3. It is an area which is close to part of that occupied by διό; but among other things, καθάπερ etc. clearly lack the Janus-like character of διό, on which see above). Again, the samples give us no grounds for distinguishing between NE, AE and EE.

iii. ὥς, ὥστε

Just as ὥς and ὥστε can both be used for positive references, so they can both be used in contexts where Aristotle is denying what some one else says. EE III uses each once in this kind of context. Again, we can have either 'a is to b ὥς c is to d' (5 times in AE A) or 'a is to b ὥστε

75. I bracket the figures for ἐπειδὴ and διότι only because of their smallness; since the words appear to be only minor variations on ἐπεὶ and ὅτι respectively, they should be kept in sight. See also n.32 above, LCM 8.1 (Jan.1983), 10.

c is to d' (once in NE IV). Another variant is 'a is to b ὥστε c to d' (twice in AE A). ὥς and ὥστε in fact appear generally interchangeable in comparisons. But there are other uses of ὥς falling under the broad heading of 'relative of manner' on which ὥστε does not trespass (e.g. in expressions like ὥς δεῖ etc.).

iv. 'As it were', 'as if'.

TABLE V

	NE IV	AE A	EE III
οἷον	4	3	1
ὥς	1	0	0
ὥστε	0	4	1

The typical contexts involved here are of the form 'x is as it were like y', 'x, like / as if / as it were y, does z'. οἷον and ὥστε appear to be mutually substitutable (? except when a complete clause is involved, where ὥστε is perhaps a more likely choice - one example, with genitive absolute, in AE A; the one example of ὥς in this use is also like this).

It happens that the pattern of occurrence of the group of words presently being considered in the chosen samples suggests uniformity of style between NE, AE and EE. But Kenny's figures indicate that the three books chosen may be to some degree unrepresentative here, or at least less than completely informative about Aristotle's usage in each of NE, AE and EE as wholes⁷⁶: not only has NE I more than six times the incidence of καθάπερ found in NE IV, but NE IV has three times the incidence of ὥστε found in NE VII; AE C has a relatively high incidence of both καθάπερ and ὥστε; and so on. But we have charted at least part of the range of stylistic choices to which - if they are a matter of style at all - these irregularities of incidence will presumably relate⁷⁷.

d. ὅτι, ὥς

ὅτι and ὥς overlap in (at least) two ways: i. in their function of introducing indirect statements; ii. in that of introducing causal clauses. i can be dealt with swiftly: ὥς merely occasionally substitutes for Aristotle's regular ὅτι (twice in NE IV, once in EE III). The only other available alternative is the accusative and infinitive construction, which so far as I know appears only once where Aristotle might have written ὅτι (ὥς), in AE A 1129a16 (though perhaps special factors are operating here). Otherwise it appears, unexpectedly, after ἀνάγκη (? 5 times in AE A, ? 6 times in EE III, ? 3 times in each strengthening an inference), ἐνδέχεται, οἶμαι, πιστεύω, φημί. ii. ὅτι and ὥς (with participle) are used for two different varieties of causal clauses, those meaning 'because x is the case', and those meaning 'on the grounds that x (as y supposes) is the case': ὥς is mostly found, as we would expect, in the second use⁷⁸, but three times in NE IV and once in AE A in the first; ὅτι is perhaps found exclusively in the first, with the possible exception of NE IV 1128b20 οὐδεὶς δὲ ἐπαινεῖσθαι ὅτι ἀσχυρηλός, with which we may compare 1125b10-12 τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὥς ἀνδρώδη, etc. (this case I counted earlier among the examples of relative ὥς, but it does nevertheless seem to have something in common with ὥς causal).

e. ... τε ... καὶ ... , καὶ ... καὶ ... , ... τε ... τε

For 'both ... and ...', ... τε ... τε occurs only once in the three sample books. If Aristotle wants to say 'both ... and ...', he normally uses ... τε ... καὶ ... (... τε καὶ ...) or καὶ ... καὶ These are probably not, however, mutually interchangeable items: he uses ... τε ... καὶ ... (καὶ ...) when he wants to refer to a pair or group as a pair (or group), while he uses καὶ ... καὶ ... (καὶ ...) when he wants to stress that something applies to each member of a pair (or group): 'not only does x apply to a, but to b; not only to b, but to a'. This would perhaps be in line with general Greek usage. The only remaining issue relating to style in this area might be the extent to which Aristotle uses ... τε ... καὶ (... καὶ ...) to link together pairs or groups, as opposed to using simple καὶ (... καὶ ...). 'Not only ... but also ...' is close to καὶ ... καὶ ..., but differs from it in that it is likely to imply that x, which is already known to apply to a, applies also to b. Perhaps καὶ ... καὶ ... is capable of functioning like this; but in any case the pattern 'not only ... but also ...' is a rare one in the sample books⁷⁹.

76. For a similar reservation in respect to another item, see n.49 above, *LCM* 8.3(Mar.1983), 37.

77. P.M.Huby, in 'The Date of Aristotle's *Topics*', *CQ* ns12(1962), 72ff., asserts that καθάπερ and ὥστε in Aristotle function as synonyms; she identifies only a certain 'difference of quality' between them. The occurrences of καθάπερ in the sample books are too few to allow us either to confirm or to disconfirm this assertion; but I wonder whether if all the occurrences of καθάπερ and ὥστε in Aristotle were analysed along the sort of lines suggested above, a chink of light might not appear between them. More specifically, is καθάπερ in principle as well adapted as ὥστε to contexts iii and iv?

78. See above, *LCM* 8.3(Mar.1983), 38-39.

79. Figures in n.24 above, *LCM* 8.1(Jan.1983), 9. (There are also two examples of ἀλλὰ καὶ ... beginning sentences, one in AE A, one in EE III, which can be treated as an abbreviated form of [ἀλλ']οὐ μόνον τοῦτο ἀλλὰ καὶ)

The famous statement by Herodotus (1.74) that Thales of Miletos predicted a solar eclipse which ended a battle between the Medes and the Lydians has frequently been used as a fixed point in the chronology of the early Greek world. Yet it is not possible to determine which of the eclipses of the period may have been the one in question.

The earliest extant attempt to determine the date of the eclipse was by Pliny (NH 2.53), who suggested the fourth year of Olympiad 48, or 170 years after the founding of Rome. This would be 585 or 584 B.C.. Pliny, whose chronology is notoriously inaccurate (he dated Pythagoras to the 7th century B.C., NH 2.37), was probably influential in the decision of G.B. Airy, Astronomer Royal from 1835 to 1881, that the eclipse in question was that of 28 May 585 B.C. (*Philosophical Transactions* 143 part 2, 1853, 179-200).

Since Airy's determination, this problem in ancient chronology has generally been considered settled. Thales' dates are believed known, and other dates in the early 6th century are fitted around the 585 date. Critical analysis of the chronology of Thales has come to a halt. One need only compare the uncritical acceptance of 585 by a long series of commentators from W.W. How and J. Wells (*Commentary on Herodotus*, Oxford 1912, vol. 1, pp. 93-94) to the present (N.G.L. Hammond, *History of Greece*, Oxford 1967, p. 174; A.H. Coxon, 'Thales', *OCD*², 1970, p. 1050) with the more open-minded discussion by commentators of the last century writing before Airy's determination had been so widely accepted (George Rawlinson, *The History of Herodotus*, New York 1861, vol. 1, p. 163; Heinrich Stein, *Herodotos*, Berlin 1877, vol. 1, pp. 90-91). In fact, the chronology of the early 6th century has in some cases been rewritten to agree with the 585 date, as, for example, the presumption that Cyrus of Persia captured Astyages as late as 549 B.C., a date which conveniently allows Astyages' 35-year reign to begin after 585 B.C., since he was not on the throne at the time of the eclipse (M.S. Drower & R.N. Frye, 'Cyrus I', *OCD*², 1970, p. 308).

The entire question of the date of Thales' eclipse needs to be re-examined, not as a chronological problem already solved, but as one temporarily derailed by over-reliance on the 585 date. Some thoughts on this follow.

1. *The internal chronology of Herodotus.*

The date of the eclipse can be determined rather precisely within Herodotus' scheme of chronology, although this date cannot be related precisely to the Julian calendar. Herodotus recorded that the eclipse occurred during the reigns of Alyattes of Lydia and Kyaraxes of Media. Alyattes reigned 57 years (1.25), and his long rule lacks synchronisms, but Kyaraxes' 40-year reign (1.106) can be synchronized with other events.

Kyaraxes' first act after coming to the throne was to besiege Ninevah, but this was interrupted by 28 years of Skythian control of Media, after which the war against Assyria was resumed, and Ninevah fell (1.103-106). It is unlikely that the Medes would have initiated a war against Lydia, which lay to the far west, beyond the Skythians, while the Skythians controlled Media. Moreover, when the Lydian war did begin, it was ended in part due to the negotiations of Labynetos of Babylon; a Babylonian negotiator would hardly have been available to the Medes until after the fall of Ninevah, since Babylon was under Assyrian control. Thus it is safe to presume that the Lydian war began only after the 28 years of Skythian control and the resumption of the Assyrian war which led to the fall of Ninevah, or no earlier than Year 28 of Kyaraxes, and probably not until Year 29 or 30, at least, since the two sieges of Ninevah would have required some time. Furthermore it was not until the fifth year of the war between Media and Lydia that the eclipse occurred (1.74). Thus Year 35 of Kyaraxes is the earliest possible, and since he reigned only 40 years, Years 35-40 seem the only time the eclipse could have occurred.

2. *When were Years 35-40 of Kyaraxes?*

This is a difficult, almost insoluble problem. Relating Median kings to the Julian calendar cannot be done because of the possible overlap between the reign of Astyages, the last Median king, and that of Cyrus of Persia. The date of Cyrus' death, Year 29 of his reign, can be synchronized with Greek history via the regnal lengths of his successors and the known dates of the Persian War of the Greeks. It seems clear that Cyrus died around 530 B.C., and thus that his regnal years date from about 559 B.C.. But whether his reign is dated from the deposition of Astyages, the beginning of his revolt against the Medes, or the death of his father, cannot be known; in fact, regnal years may begin at unexpected times. Charles II of England's reign is dated from the death of Charles I (1649), not from his own accession (1660), and such unusual dating was common (E.J. Bickerman, *Chronology of the Ancient World*², Ithaca N.Y. 1980, pp. 66-67). It is this uncertainty which has allowed Airy's eclipse of 585 B.C. to seem such a welcome fixed point. If Astyages' 35 years were immediately previous to Cyrus' 29 years, Years 35-40 of Kyaraxes would be 599-594 B.C., a period in which there was no eclipse in the eastern Mediterranean.

The one major event of Kyaraxes' reign was the fall of Ninevah. Although dates of around 612 B.C. are often suggested, even this great event cannot be dated exactly because of the vicissitudes of Babylonian chronology. As Robert Drews noted (*Historia* 18, 1969, 1-11), the chronology of the period can be suggested by not proven. Unfortunately a great deal of the modern scholarship cannot forget the date of 585 B.C..

3. *Known eclipses of the period.*

In his monumental work *Canon der Finsternisse* (Vienna 1887, English translation by Owen Gingerich, New York 1962), Theodor von Oppolzer listed 8000 solar eclipses from 1208 B.C. to A.D. 2161. The following list shows those which might have been visible to Thales (one year has been added to Oppolzer's dates to eliminate his Year Zero).

650 (Nov. 21), partial
648 (Apr. 6), total
641 (Nov. 11), partial

N. Mesopotamia, Syria
N. Greece, Italy
Mesopotamia, Anatolia

637 (Aug.29), total	Egypt, Libya
636 (Aug.19), total	Arabia, Egypt
635 (Feb.12), partial	Anatolia, Aegean
610 (Sept.30), total	Caucasus, Black Sea
607 (July 30), partial	Arabia, Egypt
603 (May 18), total	Mesopotamia, Egypt
585 (May 28), total	Anatolia, Aegean
582 (Sept.21), total	Egypt, Libya
581 (Mar.3), partial	Mesopotamia, Egypt

After the eclipse of 3 March 581 there was none in the eastern Mediterranean until 559 B.C.

This list shows the folly of associating one particular eclipse with Thales. During the century 650-550 B.C. there were 15 eclipses, including an unprecedented 8 total ones, in the eastern Mediterranean. This was exceedingly unusual: during the previous century there had been only six eclipses, and the average for the three millennia of Oppolzer's tables is slightly over 8 per century for the region. This unusual frequency in the 7th and 6th centuries B.C. may account for the seeming preoccupation with eclipses in sources of the period.

If Thales' eclipse is to be dated a few years after the fall of Ninevah, the eclipse of 603 or even 610 seems more likely than that of 585. But the problem is compounded because it is unknown where the eclipse-battle took place, or where Thales was when he made his prediction. Although it can be suggested that the battle was in eastern Anatolia and that Thales was in Miletos, such cannot be proven.

Other events in the life of Thales are of no assistance. The known date for Anaximandros of Miletos, 01.58.2, when he was 64, does not help (Diogenes Laertius 2.1-2). This date, 547 or 546 B.C., is suspiciously close to 40 years after Pliny's date for Thales, and although Anaximandros is consistently said to have been Thales' pupil, such association does not provide precise chronological data for Thales. Moreover, the story may be nothing more than an assumption that the first and second known Ionian natural philosophers had to be teacher and pupil living a generation apart. Furthermore, Thales' role as an advisor to Kroisos of Lydia (Herodotus 1.75) also adds little. Kroisos was on the throne when Sardis fell in 546 B.C.; he had ruled for 14 years and thus came to power in 560 B.C.. Yet the problems with considering the two as contemporaries are so great that Herodotus rejected the story, and again it may be only a tendency to associate the great men of the past with one another, just as Solon and Kroisos, who seem to have lived a century apart, were made contemporaries.

4. *The importance of Thales' prediction.*

As argued previously in this journal (*LCM* 3.9, Nov.1978, 249-250), Thales' prediction is hardly profound, as he merely predicted the year in which the eclipse would occur, at a time when eclipses were occurring frequently. The 'prediction' may only be later remembering of a lucky guess. Whether or not Thales had the mathematical knowledge that allowed such a prediction seems unimportant because of the casual nature of the statement. As Otto Neugebauer wrote (*Exact Sciences in Antiquity*, Providence 1957, p.142), 'even from a purely historical standpoint the whole story appears very doubtful'. Thales was also credited with predicting an earthquake (Philostratus, *Life*, 68) and the eclipse-story seems to be one of several attributions of foretelling of sudden natural phenomena to the early Ionians (cf. Cicero, *de div.*1.112; Pliny, *NH* 2.19).

6. *The dangers of Airy's 'solution'.*

There is little doubt that there was an eclipse on 28 May 585 B.C.. This has been consistently upheld by the astronomers. But the willingness of astronomers to enter the field of ancient history and to interpret the historical evidence is as intolerable as the willingness of historians and classicists to allow astronomers to write history. As J.B.Ward Perkins warned (*HSCP* 64, 1959, 3), each discipline 'has its own objectives, its own methods, and its own limitations, and it is inviting trouble to apply the results indiscriminately from one field to another'. An invaluable service has been performed by providing a list of the eclipses of antiquity. But the proper use of this list as a reference tool for creation of the historical record remains the work of the historian and classicist. It is unfortunate to see the widespread and uncritical acceptance of the 585 date by those who have not considered how the date was obtained or how it related to the historical evidence. It would be far better to discard the association of Thales with 585 entirely, and to solve chronological problems of the period independently rather than beginning from a presumed fixed point improperly obtained.

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IAN WORTHINGTON(Monash): *A façade charge in AthPol* 16.8?

LCM 8.4(Apr.1983), 59-60

We are told that Pisistratus was once called before the Areopagus to answer a charge of murder (*AthPol* 16.8; Aristotle, *Politics* 5, 1315b21-22; Plutarch, *Solon* 31.3), although when this happened is not known, and that the accuser failed to appear to press charges: ὁ δὲ προσκαλεσάμενος φοβηθεὶς ἔλιπεν (*AthPol* 16.8). Can anything political be detected in this? I believe so, in connexion with the law against tyranny.

The statement of *AthPol* 22.1 that the laws of Solon lapsed under the tyranny must be incorrect: not only do Herodotus (1.59.6) and Thucydides (6.55.5) say otherwise, but also *AthPol* contradicts itself by saying at 14.3 that Pisistratus ruled πολιτικῶς μᾶλλον ἢ τυραννικῶς (repeated at 16.2), and at 16.8 says of Pisistratus that ἐν τε γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐβούλετο πάντα διοικεῖν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους οὐδεμίαν ἑαυτῷ πλεονεξίαν διδοῦς. All previously existing laws were therefore kept in existence, including the one about tyranny; although some action must have been taken by the tyrants to prevent its enforcement, it is unlikely to have been deleted from the δέοντες (*AthPol* 16.10 refers to

60 the law during the tyranny but says nothing of any Pisistratid attempt against it).

The earliest dateable law can be ascribed to Solon (*AthPol* 8.4 Σόλωνος θέντος νόμον εἰσαγγεῖλαι περὶ αὐτῶν), but legislation against tyranny does come earlier, although it is not known when the original law was enacted. M.Ostwald, 'The Athenian legislation against tyranny and subversion', *TAPA* 86, 1955, pp.103-129, suggests that the ancient law of *AthPol* 16.10 is Draconian: Plutarch, *Solon* 19.3-5 could refer to Cylon, whose attempt may have alerted the Athenians to the danger; Dracon perhaps therefore saw the taking of a would-be tyrant's life as justifiable homicide. The first enactment may, then, possibly be Draconian, laying down death as punishment for attempted tyranny: it may then have been amended by Solon who in his law code substituted trial by the Areopagus for immediate death without trial, although still retaining the death penalty.

We know that the Areopagus served as a murder court under the tyranny and that Pisistratus once found himself there on such a charge (*AthPol* 16.8). It is possible that the murder charge was a sham, and that the real issue at work was the tyranny itself. Presumably a direct and open charge under the tyranny law would have been unsuccessful, but in this way an attempt could be made on the position of Pisistratus that would lead to a charge of tyranny.

At any rate the attempt was unsuccessful. As for the failure of the accuser to appear, the most likely explanation is that some sort of 'persuasion' was used by the partisans of Pisistratus not to press charges. Perhaps also the accuser, whoever he might be (it is plausible to assume a member of an anti-Pisistratid Eupatrid family, but to hazard the Alcmeonidae is stretching the issue too far), might simply have grown afraid as to the outcome of the trial.

After the fall of the tyranny, the descendants of the Pisistratids were outlawed by the people (Thucydides 6.55.1), presumably in an attempt to prohibit any future resurgence of power.

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R.DEVELIN(Tasmania): *The opening of AthPol*

LCM 8.4(Apr.1983), 60-61

I thank John Keaney for looking over this argument during a pleasant stay at Princeton in the latter months of 1981.

Puzzles in the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* (*AthPol*) begin with the beginning. Somewhere in Egypt towards the end of the first century A.D. someone was making a copy of the work which the sands would preserve for us, but the text which was being copied began precisely where it now begins. Whether or not the owner of the first hand intended to fill in the space he left before he began to copy, we cannot say. But the writing and the general state of the text indicate that this was a copy being made for private use and so made without the care which might attend a commercial production. So mistakes could occur. Yet, all this said, the first problem does not appear to be the responsibility of our first-century benefactor.

As the text begins, we know the subject. The Kylonian conspiracy had been mentioned, to our knowledge, by Herodotos and Thucydides before *AthPol*, and it grew in the *Atthis* and flowered in Plutarch. And, of course, it appears in the epitome of *AthPol* by Herakleides. *AthPol* begins as follows: ... Μύρωνος καὶ ἑρῶν ὁμόσαντες ἀριστίνδην. So we are at the stage where the judges (or jurors, if you like) and prosecutor have been indicated. We then have the result of the trial and of the curse on the Alkmaionidai.

AthPol opens for us with the end of a sentence, and naturally one wants to provide the beginning. But it has been realized that this is not enough. The problem is the word ἀριστίνδην. It is familiar enough in a political context and in *AthPol* itself. It denotes selection on aristocratic principles. Hence it cannot be taken with the word with which it ought logically to be connected, the preceding ὁμόσαντες. Enter Plutarch.

In *Solon* 12.2 the moralizing biographer has Solon and the best of the Athenians persuade the so-called 'accursed' δίκην ὑποχεῖν καὶ κριθῆναι τριακοσίων ἀριστίνδην δικάζοντων. So the relieved restorer has seen here the reference which ἀριστίνδην would seem to have in *AthPol*: it must go with a verb such as ἐδίκασον used in the lost portion of the text. But if that were so, ἀριστίνδην would be a long way from the verb which it qualified. In fact it is too far away.

Wilamowitz realized this (*Aristoteles und Athen* I.291 n.1; cf. the slightly different suggestion in the apparatus to his text with Kaibel, 3rd edition 1898). He had to suppose more gaps within the surviving text: *es hiess etwa ἐδίκασον δὲ κατηγοροῦντος* Μύρωνος // [*τριακοσίοι*] καὶ ἑρῶν ὁμόσαντες // [*τελείων αἰρεθέντες*] ἀριστίνδην. The reasoning is clear: another participle must be introduced denoting selection, but one cannot have two participles together, so that, although καὶ ἑρῶν alone is evidenced for oaths (see Isaios 7.28; Demosthenes 57.26), the extra word τελείων is imported (see Thucydides 5.47.8; *AthPol* 29.5: on the problem see also G.Kaibel, *Stil und Text der ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ des Aristoteles*, 1893, 117). It strains credulity, however, to believe that our scribe or any other has omitted so much. Plutarch's usage is tempting, but it hardly looks like he was using *AthPol* directly here. *AthPol* certainly did not give Myron's demotic, and so far as they mention the same details, Plutarch is much fuller and his language different. The tradition which Plutarch inherited may have known *AthPol*. We may even believe that *AthPol* mentioned that the judges judged or were selected ἀριστίνδην. But it is very difficult to accept that the surviving ἀριστίνδην in chapter 1 is that ἀριστίνδην.

So one begins to think in terms of emendation, and the one here suggested occurred to me as I came upon T 481e in Martina's collection of sources (*Solone*, 1968). He cites Hesychius s.v. ἀγχιστίνδην <ν> ὁμύων· ἐγγὺς τῶν βαμῶν. παρὰ Σόλωνι. This is not the meaning to be found in LSJ under ἀγχιστίνδην (cf. Addenda under ἀγχιστίνδην). There (and in the cited Pollux 6.175) one will find what one would normally expect: 'within the near kin'. But that was probably not the form which Hesychius used. In his edition of Hesychius (1953, followed by E.Ruschenbusch, *ΣΟΛΩΝΟΣ ΝΟΜΟΙ*, 1963,

F 42) Latte prints ἀγχιστάδην from the evidently reliable Diogenianus, while noting in the apparatus 'ἀγχιστίνην (sic) H: Wil.*', i.e. the reading of the codex and a marginal note by Wilamowitz.

We seem then to have two forms with different meanings, one (ἀγχιστίνην) with a familiar and well-attested meaning, the other (ἀγχιστάδην) technical and ancient, such that it could be noticed by the lexicographer but puzzle the scribe. The latter form could be found παρὰ Σόλωνι, perhaps on the axones; compare Hesychius s.v. τρεῖς θεοί: παρὰ Σόλωνι ἐν τοῖς ἄρσιν ὄρω τέταται. Ruschenbusch opines that Hesychius in defining ἀγχιστάδην has misunderstood the meaning by confusion with other oaths. But this is not so easy, and it is open to us to use ἀγχιστάδην as a way out of the problem with *AthPol*. The judges chosen to try the accursed swore an oath καθ' ἑρῶν ἐγγύς τῶν βασιλῶν. For the βασιλῶν cf. Lysias 2.11: the sons of Herakles ἔκλει ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλῶν ἐκαθέζοντο.

How to explain the corruption to ἀριστίνην? There is no doubt that the scribe of our version wrote ἀριστίνην, and I would assume that this was in his original. A text which made sense had been converted already into one which did not. The lazy eye of a copyist could easily have made the palaeographic mistake, especially if his text was not clearly written and given the unfamiliarity of ἀγχιστάδην. But one can suggest that the lazy eye in fact wandered from one line to another. *AthPol* may well have stated that the 300 judged or were chosen ἀριστίνην, and this latter word could well have occurred at a similar place in the line as did ἀγχιστάδην in the next line.

This exercise can, indeed, be physically attempted. The line length of the correct text may not, of course, have been the same as our text's lines at this point, but let us assume an approximation. So write the first line of our text and then compose a supplement for the line above. For example, the following produces the desired (I am aware that I want this to work) result; I give the text up to the end of the first line:

... [ἐδίκαζον αἰρεθέντες ἀριστίνην τριακῶσι κατηγοροῦν|τος]
Μύρωνος καθ' ἑρῶν ὁμόσαντες ἀγχιστάδην. καταγνωθέντος τοῦ
[ἀγους]

It would be particularly pleasant if indeed a participle in the lost line had preceded ἀριστίνην as ὁμόσαντες does ἀγχιστάδην. But enough is enough.

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V.J.MATTHEWS(Guelph, Ontario): *The meaning of ἐνθάδε at Iliad 21.279 and 23.348*

LCM 8.4(Apr.1983), 61-62

In *Iliad* 23, Nestor, in his advice to his son Antilochus before the chariot race, tells him that if he can overtake his opponents at the turning-post, no one could catch up to or pass him, not even if the man were driving the swift horse of Adrastus, Arion, ὃς ἐκ θεῶν γένος ἦεν (347), or those of Laomedon, οἱ ἐνθάδε γ' ἔτραψεν ἑσθλοί (348).

Translators have understood ἐνθάδε as meaning 'here at Troy', as they also do at *I.*21.279, where Achilles, praying to Zeus during his struggle with Skamandros, says 'I wish that Hektor had killed me, Hektor ὃς ἐνθάδε γ' ἔτραψ' ἀριστος¹. Commentators have usually passed over the word in silence, one exception being Monro, who writes on 23.348 "ἐνθάδε γε = 'among those bred in Troy', cp. 21.279"².

I suggest that, in both instances, the word has a wider meaning. Rather than 'here at Troy', it means 'here on earth'. LSJ³ does give the meaning 'in this world', opposed to the nether-world, citing Pindar, *OL.*2.57; Plato, *Gorg.*525; Aristophanes, *Ran.*82; also Aeschylus, *Suppl.*923, and Sophocles, *Ant.*75, for the phrase οἱ ἐνθάδε opposed to οἱ κάτω³.

Although the lexicon makes no reference to ἐνθάδε meaning 'in this world' as opposed to the upper world, the world of the gods, there seems to be no reason that it could not do so, and I suggest that this is its meaning in the two Homeric passages.

In the case of the horses of Laomedon, which Zeus gave to Tros in return for Ganymedes those same horses are described in *I.*5.266-267 as ἀριστοὶ | ἵππων, ὅσοι ἐσὶν ὅπ' ἥν τε ἥλιον τε, 'the best everywhere under the sun', i.e. 'the best here on earth'. Moreover, the reference to Arion, whose blood is ἐκ θεῶν, and to the horses of Laomedon, reared ἐνθάδε, is surely designed to include 'the best of both worlds', as it were, the immortal and the mortal. It is notable that Arion's divine origin is indicated in general, not particular terms, i.e. Homer does not say that the horse was the offspring of Poseidon, as did the later epic poets⁴. It seems preferable to take ἐνθάδε too in a general rather than particular sense, i.e. 'here on earth' rather than 'here at Troy'.

Achilles' reference to Hektor in *I.*21.279 can also bear such an interpretation. As does *I.*23.347-348, the passage contrasts the divine and the mortal. Achilles does not want to die in the

1. E.g. R.Lattimore, *The Iliad of Homer* (illustr. ed. Chicago 1962), 425 'in this place' (21.279), 459 'in this country' (23.348); E.V.Rieu, *Homer: The Iliad* (Penguin), 387 'in Troy' (21.279), 421 'that Troy has bred' (23.348); A.T.Murray, *Homer: The Iliad* (Loeb), 2.429 'here' (21.279), 521 'this land' (23.348).

2. D.B.Monro, *Homer: Iliad, Books XIII-XXIV* (4th ed., Oxford 1897), 406.

3. Cf. J.Burnet, *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito* (Oxford 1924), on *Apology* 40c8, 'In religious language ἐνθάδε means this world and ἐκεῖ the other world'; J.van Leeuwen, *Aristophanis Ranae* (Leiden 1968), 20.

4. Cf. Schol. T *IL.*23.347 (V.424 Erbse).

- 62 grip of Skamandros, and complains to Zeus that his mother had told him that he would be killed under the walls of Troy by the arrows of Apollo, a more glorious fate than to be drowned in a river, the sort of thing, he says, that might happen to a young swineherd (281-283). If he is not to be killed by Apollo, whom his speaking horse Xanthos had called θεῶν ἀριστος, 'best of the gods', and who had been responsible for the death of Patroklos (although allowing the κῆδος to go to Hektor) (I.19.413f.), he wishes that he had been killed by Hektor ὃς ἐνθάδε γ' ἔτραφ' ἀριστος, which surely must mean 'best of mortals' rather than 'best of the Trojans'. Nowhere in the *Iliad* is Hektor, or anyone else, described specifically as 'best of the Trojans' or 'best in Troy', and of course had Hektor killed Achilles, as in the latter's expressed wish, there would be no disputing that he was 'best of mortals'. Achilles' generous acknowledgement of Hektor's prowess is clearly expressed in the following line (21.280), 'a brave man (ἀγαθός) would have been the slayer, and a brave man (ἀγαθός) would he have slain'.

This last line is particularly poignant given the circumstances of Achilles' actual death, the approach of which is indicated in the later books of the *Iliad* in an interesting progression⁵. In I.18.96, 440f., 464f., there are only general comments that his death is near. But in I.19.416-417, the horse Xanthos tells that he is fated to fall to a god and a mortal, θεῶ τε καὶ ἀνέρι. However, in I.21.279, Achilles says only that Thetis had told him that he would die by the arrows of Apollo. Presumably he preferred to forget what his horse had told him, and thought only of a glorious death at the hands of the god. Thus, in the grip of the river and facing what he sees as an ignominious death, he says that he would have preferred to have been killed by the man he recognizes as the greatest human fighter⁶. But in I.22.358-360, Hector, on the point of death, tells him clearly that he will be killed at the Skaian Gate by Paris and Apollo. It is surely tragic that Achilles should achieve his promised death at the hands of Apollo only through the agency of that least heroic of men, Paris⁷.

Thus in this theme of divine and mortal in the death of Achilles, I submit that it is more fitting in I.21.279 that Hektor be the best of mortals rather than just the best of Trojans.

5. Cf. C.H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Harvard 1958), 270-271; M.M. Willcock, *A Companion to the Iliad* (Chicago/London 1976), 221, 238, 246.
6. Schol. T *Il.* 21.279a (V.188 Erbse) comments on τὸ μεγαλαυχεῖς of Achilles. He chooses not just a death in battle, but to be killed by the best. The scholiast suggests that Thetis acted rightly in hiding the truth from Achilles and substituting Apollos for Alexandros (Paris).
7. In Pindar, *Paian* 6.78-80, Apollo actually took on the form of Paris to kill Achilles. Cf. G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore/London 1979), 61-62.

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F.W. WALBANK (Cambridge): *Polybius and the aitia of the Second Punic War*

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In the course of his brilliant study of the relations between the Greeks and other peoples in Hellenistic times (*Alien Wisdom*, Cambridge 1975), Arnaldo Momigliano observed (p.28) that Polybius did not normally ask questions about the responsibility of Romans for wars, adding the comment that 'even the arbitrary occupation of Sardinia, though freely admitted to be unjust (P.iii.28.2), is not directly connected [sc. by Polybius] with the origins of the second Punic war'. This remarkable statement was queried by both Briscoe (*CR* 92 [1978], 110) and Derow (*JRS* 69 [1979], 9 n.27); for in 3.10.4 Polybius describes the seizure of Sardinia and the addition of 1,200 talents to the indemnity imposed on Carthage at the end of the First Punic War as δευτέραν, μεγίστην δέ, ... αἰτίαν τοῦ ... πολέμου. Momigliano subsequently replied to his critics, defending what in view of Polybius' remark must seem a paradoxical position (*Annali della scuola normale superiore di Pisa*, classe di lettere e filosofia, s.iii, 10 [1980], 1221-3, 'Interpretazioni minime IV, *Polyb.* 3.28'). His argument can be summarized as follows.

Polybius alleges three causes (αἰτίαι) for the Hannibalic War: the resentment of Hamilcar (3.9.6), the Roman seizure of Sardinia and increase in the indemnity (3.10.3-4) and the Carthaginians' success in Spain, which increased their confidence (3.10.6). He also mentions two events constituting 'the initial phase of the war': the siege of Saguntum and the crossing of the Ebro (3.6.1-3). Polybius' discussion, says Momigliano, contains two surprising features: first that he saddles Hamilcar with the greatest responsibility for the outbreak of the Second Punic War, and secondly his criticism of Hannibal (3.15.9-11) because in his reply to the Roman *legati*, instead of adducing the 'true causes' of the war, he obscured these with 'groundless pretexts' (προσάσεις ἀλόγους) about Roman interference in Saguntum; what he should have done, says Polybius, was to demand the return of Sardinia and the cancellation of the 1,200 talents.

In this passage, Momigliano argues, Polybius has, 'without noticing it', changed cards in the middle of the game: instead of 'true causes' he is now talking about 'good (and bad) arguments'. Polybius, he adds, does not specifically raise the question whether the Carthaginians and/or Hannibal were still motivated by the affair of Sardinia and the indemnity. But these in fact lose their validity as an unequivocal cause of the Second Punic War, because Hannibal treats as a cause of the war what Polybius had a little before described as its beginning.

In support of this hypothesis Momigliano points to 3.30, where Polybius seems to envisage two alternatives: (a) if the cause of the war lies in Saguntum (as Hannibal argued), the Romans were in the right; but (b) if it lay in the occupation of Sardinia and the imposing of the additional indemnity

(as Polybius himself believed), then the Carthaginians were in the right. And since Polybius leaves open the decision as between these two alternatives, it is no longer possible (since 3.30) to believe that he still regards the conquest of Sardinia and the addition to the indemnity as the greatest cause of the Hannibalic War; indeed it is doubtful whether they still remain a cause at all!

Finally Momigliano suggests that in voicing his regret that Hannibal chose to use bad arguments in replying to the Romans, Polybius reveals his 'repressed repugnance for Rome' and his profound reservations concerning Roman imperialism - thus adding one more piece of evidence '*a quelli che furono causa di amichevole disputa* [sc. about Polybius' views on Roman imperialism] *tra me e Frank Walbank*'. It is as a further round in that friendly discussion that I want to comment on the validity of Arnaldo Momigliano's argument and the conclusion he draws from it.

In the first place, it should be noted, Hannibal's reply to the Romans in 3.15 does not form part of Polybius' discussion of the causes of the Second Punic War at all, but rather of its beginnings; for in 3.12.7 he says: αἰτίας ... τὰς προειρημένους ἡγητέον, ἀρχὰς δὲ τὰς μελλούσας λέγεσθαι - which include the interview with Hannibal. Nor is this surprising, since his three alleged causes all refer to circumstances coinciding with the career of Hamilcar Barca. That is because (cf. my *Polybius*, Berkeley 1972, 159) to Polybius αἰτίαι are 'the events that shape in advance our purposes and decisions' (3.6.7), and it was Hamilcar who took the decision on the war that Hannibal was eventually to wage (3.10.5, 12.2-4) (just as it was Philip V who decided on the war that Perseus was eventually to wage: 22.18.10). Clearly then events occurring after Hamilcar's death could not be αἰτίαι, but only ἀρχαί (cf. 22.18.11). In 3.15 Polybius is indeed discussing good and bad arguments when he criticizes Hannibal for falling back on groundless pretexts; but that does not mean that there had been any sort of legerdemain by which the discussion of causes had been transformed into a discussion of arguments. On the contrary, it is part of Polybius' case criticizing Hannibal that he ought to have quoted the 'true causes' (ἀληθινὰ αἰτίαι) of the war. Arguments and causes remain quite distinct, and the phrasing of Polybius' criticism shows that he still stands by the 'causes' enumerated in 3.9-10.

Why then does Polybius bother to mention the destruction of Saguntum as a cause of the war in 3.30? The usual view is that Polybius raised it 'for the sake of argument', because it was the view of his opponents (3.6.1: they are probably 2nd-century Roman writers - see my *Commentary* ad loc. - though Musti, *Entretiens Hardt* vol.20: *Polybe*, Geneva-Vandoeuvres 1974, 116f., thinks they were Greeks). Momigliano however believes that he raised it because Hannibal had himself argued on the assumption that Saguntum was the relevant factor. This is, I think, a valuable point - though one additional to and not alternative to the usual explanation. But it should be noted that Hannibal did not, of course, make the destruction of Saguntum a cause of the war. What he did was to 'allege a non-existent cause' (τὴν ... οὐκ ὑπάρχουσαν ... πλάττων: 3.15.11), viz. that the Romans had meddled in Saguntum. And that is quite a different argument from making Hannibal's attack on Saguntum and its destruction a cause of the war. Nevertheless, by merely discussing the dispute in terms of Saguntum alone, Hannibal was an embarrassment to Polybius, since his arguments seemed to give some support to those historians who put the causes of the war in Saguntum, just as his silence over Sardinia was unwelcome to Polybius, who reckoned the Roman annexation of that island as the main cause of the war. There is sufficient justification here for Polybius' regrets at the way Hannibal conducted his interview with the *legati* without reading any 'repressed repugnance for Rome' into his observations.

There is moreover nothing in 3.30 to suggest that in quoting the two alternative views of the causes of the war Polybius had changed his own views on that subject. Momigliano's hypothesis, that he had, logically requires 3.30, with its two alternatives, to be part of his later revised edition, since Polybius can hardly have argued that the seizure of Sardinia was a major cause of the war and that it was not a major cause (or perhaps not even a cause at all) in the same draft. In his article Momigliano remarks that 'it is difficult to say whether the present passage [i.e. 3.15.9-10: but he links this closely with 3.30] was already to be found in the original version of book iii or forms part of the re-elaboration which took place after 146'; but in a letter of 24 Sept. 1981 he kindly informs me that he merely wishes to suggest that 3.15 and 3.30 stood in their present place in the final version of the *Histories* and that consequently Polybius considered them valid when he put the present text together. That is indeed true; but 3.9-10 with their clear statement on the causes of the war was also part of the final version, and I find it very difficult to accept an interpretation of 3.15 and 3.30 which is in flagrant contradiction of what stands there.

But I have, I think, shown that such a view does not impose itself, that the reference to the destruction of Saguntum as a cause of the war in 3.30 is there partly because of what Hannibal said to the *legati* and partly because it constituted the arguments of the historians Polybius was criticizing; that Polybius' inclusion of it does not imply any change in his own view about the causes of the war; and finally that in expressing regret that Hannibal took the line he did in his interview with the Roman *legati* Polybius is not revealing any profound reservations concerning Roman imperialism. Our own views on Polybius' attitude towards Roman imperialism - whatever they may be - need not therefore change as a result of anything in the early chapters of book 3. My own view, expressed on various occasions, is that after the years he spent in Rome and in particular after the events of c.152-145 Polybius came to accept the Roman *πολιτεία* - a programme aptly summarized by Virgil a century later in the line (*Aen.* 6.853) *parcere subiectis et debellare superbis*. Into which category each particular set of their opponents was to be placed was of course a matter the Romans themselves decided. But that is a theme which must be reserved for another occasion, for it would take us too far from Polybius 3.30.

This is not yet another full discussion and radical re-ordering of this already much discussed passage (most recently by M. van der Valk, 'On a few points of Attic Comedy and Tragedy', in *Studi classici in onore di Q. Cataudella* II [Catania 1972], 59-66), but rather, in the original spirit of *LCM*, a kite-flying suggestion not, as far as I can find, made before, and some indications of how it might bear on the passage.

Line 1451, εὖ γ' ὦ Παλάμηδες, ὦ σωφωτάτη φύσις, is usually taken to be a comment on inventiveness or ingenuity, and therefore re-placed together with 1452-3 after 1437-41, where Euripides puts up the idea of a flying Cleocritus and bombardment with vinegar (cf. H. Dörrie, *Hermes* 84 [1956], 304f.; D.M. MacDowell, *CQ* ns9 [1959], 263), a rearrangement supported by the recurrence at 1453 of the ὀφέδες of 1440. If that is the point of 1451, then it should clearly not follow 1446-50 which are hardly a demonstration of ordinary inventiveness and ingenuity - to say nothing of the difficulties of having 1452-3 where they stand in the traditional order.

My suggestion is that Palamedes does not here stand for the ingenuity of the proposed weapon and delivery system, but rather for the special skills of sophistry, and perhaps even for the invention of these. Certainly, if innovation is implied, it could apply to rhetorical or dialectical as well as 'technical' discovery. At *Phaedrus* 261d Plato refers to an Eleatic Palamedes, who is usually identified with Zeno on the basis of the skills listed there, that is making opposites appear identical, and the apparent connexion of the opposites mentioned with Zeno's paradoxes (so already Hermias, ad loc., who like some modern commentators, e.g. Robin and de Vries, thought inventiveness is the point: ἐπειδὴ ... καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων εὐρέτης ἐγένετο). Aristotle in his *Sophist* (fr. 65 = *Sophist* fr. 1 Ross) attributed to Zeno the invention of dialectic. It is certainly possible, even if undemonstrable, that Plato was not the first to liken Zeno to Palamedes. The comparison of Gorgias to Nestor in the same passage could be taken for or against the view that Plato simply made up that with Palamedes, but Nestor and Gorgias seem an obvious pair, for Gorgias lived exceptionally long (cf. *DK* 82 A 1-14 passim) and had plenty to say.

If Palamedes was a current soubriquet for Zeno in the 5th century the name's other connotations would be secondary or even immaterial, and the Palamedes of *Frogs* 1451 would indicate sophistry, in line with the imprecise but comically convenient way in which Aristophanes lumped together sophists and philosophers. The imprecision would be lessened if one were to accept F. Solmsen's picture of Zeno himself as a sort of sophist and experimenter rather than a committed follower of Parmenides (*Phronesis* 16 [1971] 140f.; cf. also J. Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers* [London 1979] I. 294f.; contra G. Vlastos, *JHS* 95 [1975], esp. 150-61, who incidentally cites *Frogs* 1451 as evidence that 'Palamedes' does not imply dishonesty [*ibid.* 154f.] without connecting the line with Zeno).

Sophistic argument, or rather Aristophanes' presentation of it, would be an appropriate description of the advice in 1443-50, with its list of conversions to opposite views and practices, not altogether unlike the ἀντιλογική attributed to Zeno in the *Phaedrus*, 261d-e. Moreover 1463-5 are couched in similar sophistic language, and would appropriately come soon after 1451. A.H. Sommerstein has pointed out that the reiteration of πιστ- words in 1443-7 is characteristic of the portrayal of Euripides in this play, with his devotion to Πειθῶ (*CQ* ns24 [1974], 27). But in several of the texts adduced by Sommerstein Euripides is, as often, presented as a sophist. Thus at 892 γλώσσης στρόφιγες comes with a lot of other phoney intellectual baggage of the kind attributed to Socrates the arch-sophist in the *Clouds* (cf. with αἰθερὸν ἐμὸν βόσκημα 892 αἰθέρα ... βιοδρέμματα *Clouds* 570: at *Clouds* 424 Socrates' gods are χάος, νεφέλαι and γλῶττα). *Frogs* 971-9, with references to σκέψις and λογισμός fall into the same category (cf. again *Clouds*, with the frequent invitation σκέψαι). If Euripides is being presented in his sophist guise in the earlier part of our passage too, the association with a recognizably 'sophistic' philosopher would be much to the point. As often, if the identification is not made by all, not much is lost.

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JAMES CRESSEY (Birkbeck College, London): 'A nice derangement of epitaphs': *Vergil, Aeneid* 3.714

LCM 8.4 (Apr. 1983), 64

hic labor extremus, longarum haec meta uiarum.

hinc me digressum uestris deus appulit oris. A. 3.714-715

'Aeneas calls the death of Anchises his 'last agony', losing in his sense of it all recollection of the subsequent shipwreck ...' Conington ad loc.. 'Drepanum was not in fact the end of his voyage or his suffering, but he pays Dido the compliment of saying that now he has safely reached the friendly city of Carthage he feels his trials are over.' R.D. Williams (Oxford 1962) ad loc..

But line 714 does not refer to Aeneas. For the sepulchral use of *hic* cf. Tibullus 1.3.55 *hic iacet immitti consumptus morte Tibullus*. Livy 26.25.14 *adicerentque humatis titulum, hic siti Acarnanes*. *CIL* 1, 2.11; 1211, the tralatitious *heic est sepulcrum hui pulcrum pulcrum feminae*; 1295; 1312; 1734; 1861; & passim. For *hic* linked with *meta*, Vergil, *A.* 12.546 *hic tibi mortis erant metae*. For *meta*, *A.* 10.471-2 *sua Turnum fata uocant, metasque dati peruenit at aevi* and other similar uses in *L.S.* & *OLD* s.v.. For *hic* with *labor*, *CIL* 1, 2.1325 *heic situs sum Lemiso | quem numquam nisi mors | feinituit labore*. *uia* refers to Anchises' travels and travails - the metaphorical association of the word with *uita* is frequent in Latin: for life as a journey/race cf. Dido's epitaph on herself, *A.* 4.653 *uixi, et, quem dederat cursum fortuna, peregi* (see E. Fraenkel, *Glotta* 33 [1954], 157ff.), and Dante, *Purgatorio* 20.39 *quella vita ch'al termine vola*, 33.54 *viver ch'è un correre alla morte*.

Line 714 then is Anchises' epicede.

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